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Zeno’s Paradoxes in the Mechanical World View
Shiro Ishikawa
Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science and Technology, Keio University,
3-14-1 Hiyoshi, Kohoku-ku, Yokohama, 223-8522 Japan (E-Mail: ishikawa@math.keio.ac.jp)
There is a very reason to consider that to solve Zeno’s paradoxes is to propose the theory of mechanical
world view. We believe that this is not only our opinion but also most philosophers’ opinion. Recently, in
order to justify Heisenberg‘s uncertainty principle (cf. Rep. Math. Phys Vol. 29, No. 3, 1991) more firmly.
we proposed the linguistic interpretation of quantum mechanics (called quantum and classical measurement
theory), which was characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic turn of the Copenhagen interpretation.
This turn from physics to language does not only extend quantum mechanics to classical systems but also
yield the (quantum and classical) mechanical world view (and therefore, establish the method of science). If
it be so, we may assert that Zeno’s paradoxes (Flying Arrow Paradox, Achilles and the tortoise, etc.) were
already solved in measurement theory. The purpose of this paper is to examine this assertion.
1. Introduction
1.1. Zeno’s paradox (Achilles and the tortoise)
Although there are several Zeno’s paradoxes (cf.
[1]), we believe that they are essentially the same
problem. Thus, in this paper, we devote ourselves to
the most famous Zeno’s paradox (i.e., Achilles and
the tortoise ).
(A) [Achilles and the tortoise] In a race, the quickest
runner can never overtake the slowest, since the
pursuer must first reach the point whence the
pursued started, so that the slower must always
hold a lead. Is it true?
1.2. The formulation
In what follows we shall introduce well known idea
about the above (A). For example, assume that the
velocity vq [resp. vs] of the quickest [resp. slowest]
runner is equal to v(> 0) [resp. γv (0 < γ < 1)].
And further, assume that the position of the quick-
est [resp. slowest] runner at time t = 0 is equal to 0
[resp. a (> 0)]. Thus, we can assume that the posi-
tion ξ(t) of the quickest runner and the position η(t)
of the slowest runner at time t (≥ 0) is respectively
represented by{
ξ(t) = vt
η(t) = γvt+ a
(1)
1.3. Calculations
The formula (1) can be calculated as follows (i.e.,
(i) or (ii)):
[(i): Algebraic calculation of (1)]:
Solving ξ(s0) = η(s0), that is,
vs0 = γvs0 + a
we get s0 =
a
(1−γ)v . That is, at time s0 =
a
(1−γ)v , the
fast runner catches up with the slow runner.
[(ii): Iterative calculation of (1)]:
Define tk (k = 0, 1, ...) such that, t0 = 0 and
tk+1 = γvtk + a (k = 0, 1, 2, ...)
Thus, we see that tk =
(1−γk)a
(1−γ)v (k = 0, 1, ...). Then,
we have that(
ξ(tk), η(tk)
)
=
( (1−γk)a
1−γ ,
(1−γk+1)a
1−γ
)
→
(
a
1−γ ,
a
1−γ
)
(2)
as k→∞. Therefore, the quickest runner catches up
with the slowest at time s0 =
a
(1−γ)v .
[(iii): Conclusion]: After all, by the above (i) or (ii),
we can conclude that
(B) the quickest runner can overtake the slowest at
time s0 =
a
(1−γ)v .
21.4. What is Zeno’s paradox?
It is a matter of course that what is important is
the formulation (in Section 1.2) and not the calcula-
tion (in Section 1.3). That is, we believe that what
Zeno (or, the philosophers who inherit Zeno ) wanted
to ask is as follows:
(C) Why do we believe in the formula (1)? Or,
what kind of world view is the (1) based on?
The purpose of this paper is to answer this question
(C), that is, to assert that
(D) the formula (1) is based on measurement theory.
There is a very reason to consider that the world view
in (C) is called the mechanical world view. Thus,
if the assertion (D) is generally accepted, we may
assert that measurement theory is just the theory of
mechanical world view.
2. Measurement Theory
2.1. Overview: Measurement theory
In this section, we shall mention the overview of
measurement theory (or in short, MT).
It is well known (cf. [2]) that quantum mechan-
ics is formulated in an operator algebra B(H) (i.e.,
an operator algebra composed of all bounded lin-
ear operators on a Hilbert space H with the norm
‖F‖B(H) = sup‖u‖H=1 ‖Fu‖H ) as follows:
(E) quantum mechanics
(physics)
= [quantum measurement]
(probabilistic interpretation)
+ [causality]
( kinetic equation)
Also, the Copenhagen interpretation due to N. Bohr
(et al.) is characterized as the guide to the usage
of quantum mechanics (E). Although quantum me-
chanics (E) with the Copenhagen interpretation is
generally accepted as one of the most trustworthy
theories in science, it should be noted that there is
no definitive statement of the Copenhagen interpre-
tation, that is, there are a number of ideas that are
associated with the Copenhagen interpretation. We
do not think that this fact is desirable.
Measurement theory (mentioned in the following
sections or refs. [3–13]) is, by an analogy of the (E),
constructed as the mathematical theory formulated
in a certain C∗-algebra A (i.e., a norm closed subal-
gebra in B(H), cf. [14] ) as follows:
(F) measurement theory
( language)
= [measurement]
(Axiom 1 in Section 2.2)
+ [causality]
(Axiom 2 in Section 2.2)
Note that this theory (F) is not physics but a kind
of language based on “the mechanical world view”
since it is a mathematical generalization of quantum
mechanics (E).
When A = Bc(H), the C∗-algebra composed of
all compact operators on a Hilbert space H , the (F)
is called quantum measurement theory (or, quantum
system theory), which can be regarded as the lin-
guistic aspect of quantum mechanics. Also, when
A is commutative (that is, when A is characterized
by C0(Ω), the C
∗-algebra composed of all continuous
complex-valued functions vanishing at infinity on a
locally compact Hausdorff space Ω (cf. [14, 15])), the
(F) is called classical measurement theory. Thus, we
have the following classification:
(G) measurement theory
=


quantum measurement theory
(when A = Bc(H))
classical measurement theory
(when A = C0(Ω))
That is, this theory covers several conventional sys-
tem theories (i.e., statistics, dynamical system theory,
quantum system theory).
2.2. Measurement theory
Measurement theory (F) has two formulations (i.e.,
the C∗-algebraic formulation and the W ∗-algebraic
formulation, cf. [6] ). In this paper, we devote our-
selves to the W ∗-algebraic formulation. of the mea-
surement theory (F).
Let A(⊆ B(H)) be a C∗-algebra, and let A∗ be
the dual Banach space of A. That is, A∗ =
{ρ | ρ is a continuous linear functional on A }, and
the norm ‖ρ‖A∗ is defined by sup{|ρ(F )| | F ∈
A such that ‖F‖A(= ‖F‖B(H)) ≤ 1}. Define the
mixed state ρ (∈ A∗) such that ‖ρ‖A∗ = 1 and
ρ(F ) ≥ 0 for all F ∈ A such that F ≥ 0. And
define the mixed state space Sm(A∗) such that
S
m(A∗)={ρ ∈ A∗ | ρ is a mixed state}.
A mixed state ρ(∈ Sm(A∗)) is called a pure state if
it satisfies that “ρ = θρ1+(1− θ)ρ2 for some ρ1, ρ2 ∈
S
m(A∗) and 0 < θ < 1” implies “ρ = ρ1 = ρ2”. Put
S
p(A∗)={ρ ∈ Sm(A∗) | ρ is a pure state},
3which is called a state space. It is well known (cf. [14])
that Sp(Bc(H)
∗
) = {|u〉〈u| (i.e., the Dirac notation)
| ‖u‖H = 1}, and Sp(C0(Ω)
∗) = {δω0 | δω0 is a point
measure at ω0 ∈ Ω}, where
∫
Ω
f(ω)δω0(dω) = f(ω0)
(∀f ∈ C0(Ω)). The latter implies that S
p(C0(Ω)
∗
)
can be also identified with Ω (called a spectrum space
or simply spectrum) such as
S
p(C0(Ω)
∗
)
(state space)
∋ δω ↔ ω ∈ Ω
(spectrum)
(3)
Consider the pair [A,N ]B(H), called a basic struc-
ture. Here, A(⊆ B(H)) is a C∗-algebra, and N
(A ⊆ N ⊆ B(H)) is a particular C∗-algebra (called
a W ∗-algebra) such that N is the weak closure of A
in B(H). Let N∗ be the pre-dual Banach space.
For example, we see (cf. [14]) that, when A =
Bc(H),
(i) A∗ =“trace class”, N = B(H), N∗ =“trace
class”.
Also, when A = C0(Ω),
(ii) A∗ =“the space of all signed measures on Ω”,
N = L∞(Ω, ν)(⊆ B(L2(Ω, ν))), N∗ = L1(Ω, ν),
where ν is some measure on Ω (cf. [14]).
In this paper, L∞(Ω, ν) and L1(Ω, ν) is often written
by L∞(Ω) and L1(Ω) respectively.
For instance, in the above (ii) we must clarify the
meaning of the “value” of F (ω0) for F ∈ L∞(Ω, ν)
and ω0 ∈ Ω. An element F (∈ N ) is said to be essen-
tially continuous at ρ0(∈ Sp(A∗)), if there uniquely
exists a complex number α such that
(H) if ρ (∈ N∗, ‖ρ‖N∗ = 1) converges to ρ0(∈
S
p(A∗)) in the sense of weak∗ topology of A∗,
that is,
ρ(G) −−→ ρ0(G) (∀G ∈ A(⊆ N )), (4)
then ρ(F ) converges to α.
And the value of ρ0(F ) is defined by the α.
According to the noted idea [16], an observable
O :=(X,F , F ) in N is defined as follows:
(i) [σ-field] X is a set, F(⊆ P(X), the power set of
X) is a σ-field of X , that is, “Ξ1,Ξ2, ... ∈ F ⇒
∪∞n=1Ξn ∈ F”, “Ξ ∈ F ⇒ X \ Ξ ∈ F”.
(ii) [Countable additivity] F is a mapping from F to
N satisfying: (a): for every Ξ ∈ F , F (Ξ) is a
non-negative element in N such that 0 ≤ F (Ξ)
≤ I, (b): F (∅) = 0 and F (X) = I, where 0
and I is the 0-element and the identity in N re-
spectively. (c): for any countable decomposition
{Ξ1,Ξ2, . . . ,Ξn, ...} of Ξ
(
i.e., Ξ,Ξn ∈ F (n =
1, 2, 3, ...), ∪∞n=1Ξn = Ξ, Ξi ∩ Ξj = ∅ (i 6= j)
)
, it
holds that F (Ξ) =
∑∞
n=1 F (Ξn) in the sense of
weak∗ topology in N .
With any system S, a basic structure [A,N ]B(H)
can be associated in which the measurement the-
ory (F) of that system can be formulated. A state
of the system S is represented by an element ρ(∈
S
p(A∗)) and an observable is represented by an ob-
servable O :=(X,F , F ) in N . Also, the measure-
ment of the observable O for the system S with the
state ρ is denoted by MN (O, S[ρ])
(
or more pre-
cisely, MN (O :=(X,F , F ), S[ρ])
)
. An observer can
obtain a measured value x (∈ X) by the measurement
MN (O, S[ρ]).
The Axiom 1 presented below is a kind of math-
ematical generalization of Born’s probabilistic inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics (E). And thus, it is
a statement without reality.
Now we can present Axiom 1 in the W ∗-algebraic
formulation as follows.
Axiom 1 [ Measurement ]. The probability that a
measured value x (∈ X) obtained by the measurement
MN (O :=(X,F , F ), S[ρ0]) belongs to a set Ξ(∈ F) is
given by ρ0(F (Ξ)) if F (Ξ) is essentially continuous
at ρ0(∈ Sp(A∗)).
Next, we explain Axiom 2. Let [A1,N1]B(H1)
and [A2,N2]B(H2) be basic structures. A continu-
ous linear operator Φ1,2 : N2 (with weak∗ topology)
→ N1(with weak∗ topology) is called a Markov op-
erator, if it satisfies that (i): Φ1,2(F2) ≥ 0 for any
non-negative element F2 in N2, (ii): Φ1,2(I2) = I1,
where Ik is the identity in Nk, (k = 1, 2). In addition
to the above (i) and (ii), in this paper we assume
that Φ1,2(A2) ⊆ A1 and sup{‖Φ1,2(F2)‖A1 | F2 ∈
A2 such that ‖F2‖A2 ≤ 1} = 1.
It is clear that the dual operator Φ∗1,2 : A
∗
1 → A
∗
2
satisfies that Φ∗1,2(S
m(A∗1)) ⊆ S
m(A∗2).
Here note that, for any observable O2 :=(X,F , F2)
in N2, the (X,F , Φ1,2F2) is an observable in N1.
Let (T,≤) be a tree, i.e., a partial ordered set such
that “t1 ≤ t3 and t2 ≤ t3” implies “t1 ≤ t2 or t2 ≤ t1”.
Put T 2≤ = {(t1, t2) ∈ T
2 | t1 ≤ t2}. Here, note that T
is not necessarily finite.
Assume the completeness of the ordered set T .
That is, for any subset T ′(⊆ T ) bounded from below
4(i.e., there exists t′(∈ T ) such that t′ ≤ t (∀t ∈ T ′)),
there uniquely exists an element inf(T ′) ∈ T satis-
fying the following conditions, (i): inf(T ′) ≦ t (∀t ∈
T ′), (ii): if s ≦ t (∀t ∈ T ′), then s ≦ inf(T ′).
The family {Φt1,t2 : Nt2 → Nt1}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤ is called
a Markov relation (due to the Heisenberg picture), if
it satisfies the following conditions (i) and (ii).
(i) With each t ∈ T , a basic structure [At,Nt]B(Ht)
is associated.
(ii) For every (t1, t2) ∈ T 2≤, a Markov operator
Φt1,t2 : Nt2 → Nt1 is defined. And it satisfies
that Φt1,t2Φt2,t3 = Φt1,t3 holds for any (t1, t2),
(t2, t3) ∈ T 2≤.
When Φ∗t1,t2 (S
p(A∗t1)) ⊆ (S
p(A∗t2)) holds for any
(t1, t2) ∈ T 2≤, the Markov relation is said to be de-
terministic. Note that the classical deterministic
Markov relation is represented by {φt1,t2 : Ωt1 →
Ωt2}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤ , where the continuous map φt1,t2 :
Ωt1 → Ωt2 is defined by
Φ∗t1,t2(δω1) = δφt1,t2 (ω1) (∀ω1 ∈ Ω1)
Now Axiom 2 is presented as follows:
Axiom 2 [Causality]. The causality is represented
by a Markov relation {Φt1,t2 : Nt2 → Nt1}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤ .
———————————————————————————————————————————-
world
view


R© : Aristotle
(realism)
1©
−−→
(monism)
Newton
(realism)
−→


theory of
relativity −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
quantum
mechanics −→


−−−−−−−−−−−→
realistic view
2©:dualism
−−−−−−−−−−−→
3©:linguistic turn
L© :
Plato
Parmenides
(idealism)
4©
−−→
(dualism)
Kant
Descartes
(idealism)
5©
−−→
philosophy
of language
(linguistic view)
6©:axiomatization
−−−−−−−−−−−→
7©:linguistic view

 −→
(unsolved)
theory of
everything
(physics)


8©
−−→
measurement
theory (=MT)
(scientific language)
Figure 1. The development of the world views. For the explanations of 1©- 8©, see [9, 11].
2.3. The Linguistic Interpretation
According to [8,9,11], we shall explain the linguistic
interpretation of quantum mechanics. The measure-
ment theory ( F) asserts
(I) Obey Axioms 1 and 2. And, describe any ordi-
nary phenomenon according to Axioms 1 and 2
(in spite that Axioms 1 and 2 can not be tested
experimentally).
Still, most readers may be perplexed how to use Ax-
ioms 1 and 2 since there are various usages. Thus,
the following problem is significant.
(J) How should Axioms 1 and 2 be used?
Note that reality is not reliable since Axioms 1 and 2
are statements without reality.
Here, in spite of the linguistic turn ( Figure 1: 3©)
and the mathematical generalization from B(H) to a
C∗-algebra A, we consider that the dualism (i.e., the
main spirit of so called Copenhagen interpretation)
of quantum mechanics is inherited to measurement
theory. Thus, we present the following interpretation
(K) [=( K1)–( K3)]. That is, as the answer to the
question (J), we propose:
(K1) Consider the dualism composed of “observer”
5and “system( =measuring object)”. And there-
fore, “observer” and “system” must be abso-
lutely separated. See Figure 2.
(K2) Only one measurement is permitted. And thus,
the state after a measurement is meaningless
since it can not be measured any longer. Also,
the causality should be assumed only in the side
of system, however, a state never moves. Thus,
the Heisenberg picture should be adopted rather
than the Schro¨dinger picture.
(K3) Also, the observer does not have the space-time.
Thus, the question: “When and where is a mea-
sured value obtained?” is out of measurement
theory,
and so on.
•
observer
(I(=mind))
system
(matter)
✛
✲
observable
measured
value
a©interfere
b©perceive a reaction
state
Figure 2. Dualism in MT.
In this sense, we consider that measurement theory
holds as a kind of language-game (with the rule (Ax-
ioms 1 and 2, Interpretation (K)), and therefore,
measurement theory is regarded as the axiomatiza-
tion ( Figure 1: 6©) of the philosophy of language
(i.e., Saussure’s linguistic world view). For the pre-
cise explanations of Figures 1 and 2, see [9, 11].
Note that quantum mechanics (E) has many inter-
pretations. On the other hand, we believe that the
interpretation of measurement theory (F) is uniquely
determined as in the above. This is our main reason
to propose the linguistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics. We believe that this uniqueness is essen-
tial to the justification of Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle (cf. [11, 17]).
Example 1 [Simultaneous measurement] For
each k = 1, 2, ...,K, consider a measurement MN (Ok
:= (Xk, Fk, Fk), S[ρ]). However, since the (K2)
says that only one measurement is permitted, the
{MN (Ok, S[ρ])}
K
k=1 should be reconsidered in what
follows. Under the commutativity condition such
that
Fi(Ξi)Fj(Ξj) = Fj(Ξj)Fi(Ξi) (5)
(∀Ξi ∈ Fi, ∀Ξj ∈ Fj , i 6= j),
we can define the simultaneous observable ×Kk=1Ok
= (×Kk=1Xk, ⊠Kk=1Fk, ×
K
k=1Fk) in N such that
(×Kk=1Fk)(×
K
k=1Ξk) = F1(Ξ1)F2(Ξ2) · · ·FK(ΞK)
(6)
(∀Ξk ∈ Fk, ∀k = 1, ...,K).
where (×Kk=1Xk, ⊠Kk=1Fk) is the product measurable
space. Then, the above {MN (Ok, S[ρ])}
K
k=1 is, under
the commutativity condition (5), represented by the
simultaneous measurement MN (×Kk=1Ok, S[ρ]).
Example 2 [How to use Axiom 2 (Causality)] Con-
sider a finite tree (T :={t0, t1, ..., tn}, ≤) with the
root t0. This is also characterized by the map pi :
T \ {t0} → T such that pi(t) = max{s ∈ T | s < t}.
Let {Φt′,t : Nt → Nt′}(t′,t)∈T 2
≤
be a Markov rela-
tion, which is also represented by {Φpi(t),t : Nt →
Npi(t)}t∈T\{t0}. Let an observable Ot :=(Xt,Ft, Ft)
in the Nt be given for each t ∈ T . Consider the
pair OT = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φpi(t),t : Nt → Npi(t)}t∈T\{t0}
], which is called a sequential observable. Let ρ0 ∈
S
p(A∗t0 ). Consider “measurement” such as
(L) a measurement of a sequential observable OT for
the system with a ρ0.
where the meaning of the (L) is not clear yet. Recall-
ing that the (K3) says that a state never moves, we
consider the meaning of the (L) as follows: For each
s ∈ T , put Ts = {t ∈ T | t ≥ s}. And define the
observable Ôs = (×t∈TsXt,⊠t∈TsFt, F̂s) in Ns (due
to Heisenberg picture) as follows:
Ôs =


Os (if s ∈ T \ pi(T ) )
Os×(×t∈pi−1({s}) Φpi(t),tÔt) (if s ∈ pi(T ))
(7)
if the commutativity condition holds (i.e., if the si-
multaneous observable Os×(×t∈pi−1({s}) Φpi(t),t Ôt)
exists) for each s ∈ pi(T ). Using (7) iteratively, we
can finally obtain the observable Ôt0 (which is also
denoted by ÔT ) in Nt0 , which is regarded as the re-
alization of OT . Thus the above (L) is represented
by the measurement MNt0 (ÔT , S[ρ0]).
62.4. Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (Space-
Time Problem)
Consider a basic structure [A,N ]B(H). Let AS (⊆
N ) be the commutative C∗-subalgebra. Note that
AS is represented such that AS = C0(ΩS) for some
locally compact Hausdorff space ΩS (cf. [14]). As
seen in the formula (3), the ΩS is called a spectrum.
For example, consider one particle quantum system,
formulated in a basic structure:
[Bc(L
2(R3)), B(L2(R3))]B(L2(R3)).
Then, we can choose the commutative C∗-algebra
C0(R
3) (⊂ B(L2(R3)), and thus, we get the spec-
trum R3. This simple example will make us propose
the (M2) later.
In Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (1715–1716),
they (i.e., Leibniz and Clarke(=Newton’s friend) )
discussed “space-time problem”. Their ideas are
summarized as follows:
(M1)


R©: Newton, Clarke
(realistic world view)
· · ·
(space-time in physics)
realistic space-time
L©: Leibniz
(linguistic world view)
· · ·
(space-time in language)
linguistic space-time
That is, Newton considered “What is space-time?”.
On the other hand, Leibniz considered “How should
space-time be represented?”, though he did not pro-
pose his language. Measurement theory is in Leib-
niz’s side, and asserts that
(M2) Space should be described as a kind of spectrum.
And time should be described as a kind of tree.
In other words, time is represented by a param-
eter t in a linear ordered tree T .
Therefore, we think that the Leibniz-Clarke debates
should be essentially regarded as “the linguistic world
view L©” vs. “the realistic world view R©” in Figure
1. Hence, the statement (M2) should be added to
Interpretation (K) as sub-interpretation of measure-
ment theory.
3. Preliminary mathematical results
Let Λ̂ be an index set. For each λ ∈ Λ̂, consider
a set Xλ. For any subsets Λ1 ⊆ Λ2( ⊆ Λ̂), PΛ1,Λ2 is
defined by the natural projection such that:
×
λ∈Λ2
Xλ ∋ (xλ)λ∈Λ2 −−−−→
PΛ1,Λ2
(xλ)λ∈Λ1 ∈ ×
λ∈Λ1
Xλ.
For each λ ∈ Λ̂, consider an observable (Xλ,Fλ, Fλ)
in W ∗-algebra N . And consider the quasi-product
observable O ≡ (×
λ∈Λ̂Xλ, ⊠ λ∈Λ̂Fλ, FΛ̂) of { (Xλ,
Fλ, Fλ) | λ ∈ Λ̂ }, which is defined by the observable
such that:
F̂Λ̂(P
−1
{λ},Λ̂
(Ξλ)) = Fλ(Ξλ) (∀Ξλ ∈ Fλ, ∀λ ∈ Λ̂),
(8)
though the existence and the uniqueness of a quasi-
product observable are not guaranteed in general.
The following theorem says something about the ex-
istence and uniqueness of the quasi-product observ-
able.
Theorem 1 [W ∗-algebraic Kolmogorov extension
theorem, cf. [6, 18]]. For each λ ∈ Λ̂, consider a
Borel measurable space (Xλ,Fλ), where Xλ is a sep-
arable complete metric space. Define the set P0(Λ̂)
such as P0(Λ̂) ≡ {Λ ⊆ Λ̂ | Λ is finite }. Assume that
the family of the observables
{
OΛ ≡ ( ×λ∈ΛXλ,
⊠ λ∈ΛFλ, FΛ ) | Λ ∈ P0(Λ̂)
}
in N satisfies the
following “consistency condition”:
(N) for any Λ1, Λ2 ∈ P0(Λ̂) such that Λ1 ⊆ Λ2,
it holds that
FΛ2
(
P−1Λ1,Λ2(ΞΛ1 )
)
= FΛ1
(
ΞΛ1
)
(∀ΞΛ1 ∈ ⊠
λ∈Λ1
Fλ). (9)
Then, there uniquely exists the observable ÔΛ̂ ≡(
×
λ∈Λ̂Xλ, ⊠ λ∈Λ̂ Fλ, F̂Λ̂
)
in N such that:
F̂Λ̂
(
P−1
Λ,Λ̂
(ΞΛ)
)
= FΛ
(
ΞΛ
)
(∀ΞΛ ∈ ⊠
λ∈Λ
Fλ, ∀Λ ∈ P0(Λ̂)).
Proof. See [6].
As mentioned in [8], we believe that
(O) the utility of Kolmogorov’s extension theorem is
due to the interpretation (K2).
We think that this view is the most essential in all
statements concerning Kolmogorov’s extension theo-
rem.
Consider a Borel measurable space (X,BX), where
X is a (locally compact) separable complete metric
space. Let Ω ba locally compact Hausdorff space with
a suitable measure ν. Let g be a quantity, that is, a
7continuous map g : Ω → X . Define the observable
Og = (X,BX , G) in L∞(Ω, ν) such that
[G(Ξ)](ω) = χg−1(Ξ)(ω) =
{
1 if ω ∈ g−1(Ξ)
0 if ω /∈ g−1(Ξ)
(∀Ξ ∈ BX , ω ∈ Ω). (10)
Lemma 1 [The measurement of a quantity]. Let
Og = (X,BX , G) be the observable induced by a quan-
tity g : Ω → X as in (10). Let x (∈ X)
be a measured value obtained by the measurement
ML∞(Ω,ν)(Og, S[δω0 ]). Then, we can surely believe
that x = g(ω0). That is, for any open set D (⊆ X)
such that g(ω0) ∈ D, the probability that a measured
value obtained by ML∞(Ω,ν)(Og, S[δω0 ]) belongs to D
is equal to 1.
Proof. Let D(∈ BX) be any open set such that
g(ω0) ∈ D. According to Axiom 1, the probability
that a measured value x obtained by the measure-
ment ML∞(Ω,ν)(Og, S[δω0 ]) belongs to D is given by
χ
g−1(D)
(ω0) = 1. Since D is arbitrary, we can surely
believe that x = g(ω0).
Lemma 2. Consider a finite tree (T :={t0, t1, ..., tn},
≤) with the root t0. Let {Φt′,t : L
∞(Ωt) →
L∞(Ωt′) }(t′,t)∈T 2
≤
be a deterministic Markov rela-
tion, which is also represented by the determinis-
tic maps {φpi(t),t : Ωpi(t) → Ωt}T\{t0}. For each
t ∈ T , consider a continuous map gt : Ωt → Xt.
and consider an observable Ogt := (Xt, BXt , Gt)
in the L∞(Ωt) induced by a quantity gt. Let ÔT be
the realization of the deterministic sequential observ-
able OT = [{Ogt}t∈T , {φpi(t),t : Ωpi(t) → Ωt}T\{t0}].
Let (xt)t∈T (∈ ×t∈T Xt) be a measured value ob-
tained by the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν) (ÔT , S[δω0 ]).
Then, we can surely believe that xt = gt(φ0,t(ω0))
(∀t ∈ T ). That is, for any open set Dt (⊆ Xt)
such that gt(φ0,t(ω0)) ∈ Dt (∀t ∈ T ), the prob-
ability that a measured value (xt)t∈T obtained by
ML∞(Ωt0 ,νt0 )(ÔT , S[δω0 ]) belongs to ×t∈T Dt is equal
to 1.
Proof. This is a slight generalization of
Lemma 1. Thus, the proof is easy as follows. For
each t ∈ T , consider any open set Dt(∈ BXt) such
that gt(φ0,t(ω0)) (= (gt ◦ φ0,t)(ω0)) ∈ Dt. Ac-
cording to Axiom 1, the probability that a mea-
sured value (xt)t∈T obtained by the measurement
ML∞(Ωt0 ,νt0 )(ÔT , S[δω0 ]) belongs to×t∈T Dt is given
by Π
t∈T
χ
(gt◦φ0,t)
−1(Dt)
(ω0) = 1. This completes the
proof.
4. Zeno’s paradox in measurement the-
ory
4.1. What is Zeno’s paradox?
Now we can review the question:“What is Zeno’s
paradox?” in Section 1.4 as follows:
(P1) From Figure 1, choose the proper world view
on which the formula (1) should be based!
(P2) Or, if there is no proper world view in this figure,
propose and add a new world view to Figure 1.
Of course, we shall execute the our assertion (D) in
the following section.
4.2. Zeno’s paradox in measurement theory
According to the space-time problem: (M2), define
the time axis by T̂ = [0,∞) with the usual order
≤. For each t ∈ T̂ , consider a classical basic struc-
ture [C0(Ωt), L
∞(Ωt, νt)]B(H). Here it may be usual
to assume that Ωt = Ω (∀t). Further, consider a
quantity gt : Ωt → Xt(≡ R2), which, by (10), in-
duces the observable Ogt = (Xt,BXt , Gt) in L
∞(Ωt),
and consider the deterministic sequential observable
O
T̂
= [{Ogt}t∈T̂ , {φt′,t : Ωt′ → Ωt}(t′,t)∈T̂ 2
≤
]. Here,
for any finite T (∈ P0(T̂ )), we have a deterministic
sequential observable OT = [{Ogt}t∈T , {φt′,t : Ωt′ →
Ωt}(t′,t)∈T 2
≤
], which has the realization ÔT in L
∞(Ω0)
(cf. Lemma 2). Consider the family {ÔT | T ∈
P0(T̂ )}, which clearly satisfies the consistency condi-
tion (N). Thus, by Theorem 1, we get the realization
Ô
T̂
in L∞(Ω0) of the sequential observable OT̂ . Let
(xt)t∈T̂ (∈ ×t∈T̂ Xt) be a measured value obtained
by the measurement ML∞(Ω0,ν0)(ÔT̂ , S[δω0 ]). Then,
we can surely believe that
xt = gt(φ0,t(ω0) (∀t ∈ T̂ ) (11)
That is, for any T ∈ P0(T̂ ) and any open set Dt (⊆
X) such that gt(φ0,t(ω0)) ∈ Dt (∀t ∈ ∀T ), the prob-
ability that a measured value (xt)t∈T̂ obtained by
ML∞(Ωt0 ,νt0 )(ÔT̂ , S[δω0 ]) belongs to P
−1
T,T̂
(×t∈T Dt) is
equal to 1.
Recall the formula (1). If we put
(Q) xt = (ξ(t), η(t)) = (vt, γvt+ a) (∀t ∈ [0,∞)),
we can describe the formula (1) in terms of measure-
ment theory. That is, in measurement theory, the
formula (1) should be understood as the equation of
measured values. Of course, the calculation of the
(Q) is the same as that of Section 1.3.
8Remark 1. (i): In [7], the above was discussed in
the special case that Ωt = Xt = R
2. Now we think
that it is not sufficient and it should be improved
as mentioned in this section. However, in the sense
mentioned in the abstract, we believe that Zeno’s
paradoxes were already solved in measurement the-
ory [3–13].
(ii): The beginners of philosophy may misunderstand
“Achilles and the tortoise” as the elementary math-
ematical problem concerning infinite series. In order
to avoid the confusion, we choose “Achilles and the
tortoise” and not “flying arrow paradox”, though the
latter is the most excellent in all Zeno’s paradoxes.
5. Conclusions
What we executed in this paper is merely the trans-
lation from “ordinary language” to “scientific lan-
guage”, that is,
(Achilles and the tortoise)
(A) in Section 1.1
(ordinary language)
MT
−−−−−−−→
translation
(Achilles and the tortoise)
Section 4.2
(scientific language)
We believe that this translation is just “the mechan-
ical world view” or “the method of science” (at least,
science in the series L© of Figure 1). That is, ordi-
nary science (at least, its basic statements ) should be
described in terms of measurement theory. For exam-
ple, for the translation of equilibrium statistical me-
chanics and the Monty-Hall problem, see [12]and [13]
respectively .
Since Zeno’s paradoxes have the long history of
2500 years, we should refrain from the immediate
conclusion. However, we believe that our view (C)
is the central subject of Zeno’s paradoxes.
We hope that some readers will propose another
powerful scientific language (as mentioned in (P2) ),
and also, our assertion will be examined from the
various points of view.
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